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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: MORAL AGENCY 
AND THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN                                  
REPARATIONS PROGRAMS 
CARLTON WATERHOUSE* 
ABSTRACT 
In the ongoing debate over reparations for slavery and its 
legacy in the United States, much of the reparations scholarship 
pays little attention to the quality of past reparations programs 
implemented domestically or abroad.1  Most commentators 
emphasize the need for former wrongdoers to make apology, 
recompense, or restitution rather than looking at results—namely 
the restoration and recovery of victims.2  The problem is not 
limited to theorists and scholars.  Repeatedly, the political contests 
over guilt and innocence that precede the development of 
reparations programs obscure consideration of the critical role that 
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1 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES 
AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH] (offering a comprehensive examination of domestic 
and international reparations programs). 
2 The rejection of reparations as a viable response to past injustice by some 
commentators coupled with the popular disapproval of reparations for slavery in 
the United States has led to a narrow emphasis in literature on the legal and moral 
warrants for reparations.  See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003) 
(illuminating the ethical, legal, and institutional problems of reparations 
programs).  But see Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811 
(2006) (arguing that the analysis in Posner and Vermeule’s article is too narrow 
and rigid). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
258 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
communities and individuals suffering from past abuses should 
play in establishing those programs in order to reestablish their 
personal well-being and societal standing.  The resulting focus on 
wrongdoers replicates the former subordination of the victims of 
past abuses by rendering them the passive recipients of 
government actions, over which they have little or no control.  This 
Article advances an important but overlooked measure for 
evaluating reparations programs:  the role of victims in the design 
and implementation process. 
The increased use of reparations by governments to redress 
past injustices and bring closure to the misdeeds of the past, 
characterized the latter half of the twentieth century.3  While this 
development, and the accompanying focus upon reparations by 
the human rights community, represent genuine improvements 
over the historic neglect of those abused by former regimes, few 
reparations programs have been particularly “good” when viewed 
from the victims’ perspective.4  In fact, when evaluated based on 
their substantive rather than their symbolic restoration of victims 
and their families, most programs should be classified as either 
“bad” or “ugly.”  My basis for this characterization arises from the 
failure of most programs to afford injured groups and individuals 
a meaningful role in the design and implementation of reparations 
programs.  As I have written elsewhere, “[e]fforts to redress past 
harms can actually be counter-productive, cruel, or insulting when 
they are not accompanied by actions that attend to both the needs 
and agency of the injured group.”5  When using these criteria, the 
 
3 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–98 (reviewing the history of 
reparation schemes throughout history and noting the recent wave of reparations 
that constitute the present understanding of the term).  See generally ELAZAR 
BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL 
INJUSTICES (2000) (providing an analysis of restitution efforts across the globe since 
World War II). 
4 For a variety of perspectives on this topic see WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, 
supra note 1 (critiquing several modern attempts at a program of reparations). 
5 Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step In A Series of Unfortunate Legal 
Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to 1972 and a 
Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
207, 222 (2006).  As used here, “moral agency” refers to the ability to make moral 
judgments and to act in accordance with those judgments in the world.  See 
generally WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 
1987) (exploring the relationship between moral agency and oppressive social 
norms); SUSAN J. HEKMAN, MORAL VOICES, MORAL SELVES: CAROL GILLIGAN AND 
FEMINIST MORAL THEORY (1995) (re-acknowledging the need for women to find 
their own moral voice so as not to be marginalized by a masculine moral theory). 
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inadequacy of most reparations schemes becomes apparent, due to 
their primary focus on the needs and the moral agency of the 
former violators.  This Article engages the discourse on reparations 
by focusing on the quality of domestic and international 
reparations programs in light of their routine failure to attend to 
the moral agency of the victims of past human rights abuses. 
Governments guilty of past injustices may express moral 
agency through formal apologies or even tacit acceptance of 
responsibility for past human rights abuses.  Through their 
willingness to acknowledge past injustices and the injuries they 
caused, governments act as moral agents.  Their agency is further 
expressed through financial or other measures directed toward 
victims.  Historically, victims have been denied this same 
opportunity to develop agency as most reparations programs limit 
injured groups and individuals to the passive acceptance of 
government actions.6  This Article maintains that injured parties 
can best express moral agency through their participation in the 
development and implementation of reparations programs.  This 
approach will allow injured parties to play an important role in the 
political community through their participation in the active 
remediation of their injuries. 
This Article consists of three Sections.  The first Section briefly 
examines characteristics of the most common reparations 
approaches:  compensation, restitution, and reconciliation.  The 
second Section assesses the quality of four well-known reparations 
programs based on their attention to the victims’ moral agency in 
the design and implementation process.  The final Section 
considers an institutional-based approach to reparations as an 
underutilized means of redress that may best facilitate the moral 
agency of victims. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 While victims retain the ability to exercise their agency through the out-
and-out rejection of government efforts, this take it or leave it approach to 
reparations frustrates both the reconciliation of the political community and the 
remediation of victims’ harms.  See generally ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND 
FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2004) (examining atonement 
and forgiveness as a complimentary set of moral obligations placed on both 
perpetrators and victims of past injustices within the context of U.S. slavery and 
segregation). 
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1. COMMON REPARATIONS APPROACHES  
1.1. Compensation 
The most well-known approach to reparations requires that 
wrongdoers pay damages to persons harmed by the wrongdoer’s 
past conduct.  Popular among lawyers, compensatory reparations 
authorize the payment of damages for physical, political, 
psychological, economic, and other harms suffered.7  These 
reparations can issue from the ruling of a court, the enactments of a 
legislature, or the funds of a commission responsible for 
administering transitional justice.8  Compensatory schemes range 
from the establishment of victim funds used for education or 
health care, to individual payments to the families or descendants 
of deceased victims.9  As a method of making reparations, 
compensation schemes can be beneficial or deleterious, depending 
on their design.10 
Through compensation programs, past violators can offer 
monetary payments in a collective fund or in individual 
payments.11  Accordingly, their role in reparations can be resolved 
through a lump sum disbursement or one time payout.  Under 
 
7 See Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 475, 475–77 (2003) (distinguishing compensatory reparations 
from rehabilitative reparations). 
8 See generally BROOKS, supra note 6 (noting some of the avenues pursued by 
the Black redress movement). 
9 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–98. 
10 As discussed below, compensation schemes have accompanied the best 
and the worst reparations programs.  See infra Section 2.  See also Hurbert Kim, 
German Reparations: Institutionalized Insufficiency, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, 
supra note 1, at 77, 77–80 (pointing out the harmful insufficiencies in the German 
reparation scheme to compensate victims of Nazi atrocities); Roy L. Brooks, What 
Form Redress?, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 87, 88–90 (noting 
many of the pitfalls associated with Japan’s response to “comfort women”). 
11 See Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra 
note 1, at 3, 8–9 (previewing various compensatory reparation programs with 
monetary and non-monetary components); see also Japan’s Official Response to 
Reparations, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 126, 126–31 (outlining 
the Asian Women’s Fund created to distribute reparations to Japanese comfort 
women); see also Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, German 
Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 
1, at 61, 61–67 (detailing the reparations made by the Germans in response to the 
Nazi atrocities). 
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either approach, past violators fulfill their obligation through a 
discrete financial transaction that restores their moral standing and 
brings ready closure to a shameful past.12  Unlike models that 
require the return of land or property, discussed below, monetary 
compensation offers a relatively efficient way for those making 
reparations to bring finality to the process.13 
Individual payment-based compensation mechanisms also 
carry some advantages for recipients.  Due to their individual 
nature, they allow recipients to use reparations in the way that 
they feel best addresses the past harms suffered by them or their 
family.14  Cash payments can be used for innumerable goods and 
services to redress past harms or meet existing needs or desires.  In 
this way, recipients can exercise autonomy in the reparations 
process in order to remedy the powerlessness and subjugation they 
may have suffered in the past.15  Accordingly, compensation may 
be used as a valuable part of a reparations scheme that meets the 
needs of victims and facilitates their involvement in the reparations 
process.16  However, compensation can represent a cheap payoff or 
blood money when it fails to reflect the needs or wishes of 
victims.17 
1.2. Restitution 
Restitution represents one of the most wide-ranging 
reparations options.18  Amenable to diverse applications, it can 
serve to facilitate the return of real and personal property to 
 
12 See infra Section 2.1. (providing four examples of compensatory reparations 
programs, Germany’s response to the Holocaust, Japan’s response to the Korean 
comfort women, America’s experience with the Indian Claims Commission, and 
Argentina’s response to the victims of political violence). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See infra notes 119–31 (describing the mindset of a subsection of the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo); cf. Mark William Bakker, Comment, Repairing the 
Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 
N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1497–98 (1994) (advocating for a system of restitution instead of 
incarceration as a way to better serve victims). 
18 See, e.g., Elazar Barkan, Restitution and Amending Historical Injustices in 
International Morality, in POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL 
INJUSTICES 91–102 (John Torpey ed., 2003) [hereinafter POLITICS AND THE PAST] 
(offering multiple examples of nations who have issued restitution and public 
apologies as a means of acknowledging past wrongs and group suffering). 
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previous individual owners, provide stolen wages and lost profits 
to forced laborers, or repatriate tribes and clans to ancestral lands.19  
This variety of uses also means that restitution’s efficiency, 
effectiveness, and efficacy varies as well.20  In implementation, 
restitution can range in procedural and technical complexity, from 
the intricacies associated with courtroom litigation to the relative 
simplicity associated with obtaining a driver’s license.  Schemes 
can mandate strict burdens of proof requiring documentary 
ownership rights superior to all others, but may just as readily 
admit oral histories that establish personal or familial possession 
during a particular time.21  Accordingly, the appeal of 
restitutionary reparations for past violators as well as victims will 
vary widely. 
Highly technical restitution mechanisms provide past violators 
with a bureaucratized process that limits the number of recipients 
through quasi-legal administrative procedures.22  Nevertheless, the 
individualized nature of the claims and the evidentiary burdens 
result in lengthy claim procedures that may involve repeated court 
appeals to resolve intractable ownership questions.23  As a general 
matter, these approaches construe reparations narrowly and limit 
awards to those victims capable of successfully navigating the 
established procedural hurdles.24  Past violators may benefit from 
these mechanisms by limiting the range of recipients and the scope 
of restitution in each particular year.25  However, the 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 An alternative approach used by some governments to address land claims 
provides qualifying claimants with compensation or available land tracts rather 
than restoration of original lands.  Under this policy, governments can avoid the 
technical and legal challenges associated with resolving competing claims for 
specific property.  Moreover, this methodology offers past violators a more 
efficient and less costly way to administer restitution programs to a larger number 
of recipients by decreasing administrative and legal costs.  For the claimants, this 
mechanism offers a less bureaucratic and technical system to recover lost property 
or its value.  In exchange, however, claimants surrender their right to obtain 
specific property that may have an incommensurable sacramental or sentimental 
value.  Under either approach, Barkan makes clear that restitution awards 
represent negotiated redress of past injustices that fit into a larger narrative about 
national identity that reconciles past actions with contemporary notions of justice 
and desert.  BARKAN, supra note 3, at 320–21. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
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administrative costs and the political exposure associated with 
slow moving individual based mechanisms can present significant 
challenges to the long-term viability of these mechanisms.  An 
additional benefit of these means for some past violators will be 
the ability to construct the future society by determining the 
beneficiaries of substantial assets reverting to private ownership.26  
Elazar Barkan makes clear that in Eastern Europe, more often than 
not, members of the pre-communist middle class typically 
benefited from restitution schemes.27  This results from the 
temporal nature of restitution and its dependence upon a “rightful 
ownership” rooted in history.28  Rather than restoring property to 
those with earliest ownership or those “most entitled to it,” 
restitution seeks a particular time that predates a recent injustice to 
support a claim.29  In Eastern Europe, this meant that countries 
considered restitution claims for property taken under the 
communist regime, but excluded claims rooted in procommunist 
property appropriations.30  In doing so, governments sought to 
redress communist injustices but not those of the preceding 
regimes.31  This temporal characteristic creates difficult legal and 
moral challenges when claimants offer competing prior claims of 
ownership for restitution.  As seen with the history of the United 
States Indian Claims Commission, discussed below, restitution can 
be a nightmare for victims.32  Although restitution holds the 
unique potential to return the real and personal property 
wrongfully taken from victims, the procedures that accompany it 
can easily deteriorate into a bureaucratic nightmare for victims that 
can rob the process of its reparative potential.33 
1.3. Apology, Atonement, and Reconciliation 
In some cases, reparations take the form of a reconciliation 
process.  These processes consist of apologies and symbolic awards 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 118–19 (explaining that in Eastern Europe the goal of economic 
development was often chosen at the expense of a logical, comprehensive and 
moralistic restitution scheme). 
28 See Id. at 118–19. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 120. 
31 Id. 
32 See infra notes 79–87. 
33 BARKAN, supra note 3, at 120–21. 
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or projects as part of a broader process of reconciling victims and 
those responsible for harming them.34  Roy Brooks argues that 
awards offered in conjunction with an apology constitute 
atonement by past violators that warrant forgiveness by victims.35  
Under this theory, the reconciliation of the parties represents the 
primary component of reparations.36  The primary goal of these 
approaches flows from a drive to repair broken relationships 
caused by past injustices.37  Atonement awards represent a 
symbolic gesture by past violators of the good faith of their 
apology.38  When past injustices resist material redress, symbolic 
acts provide past violators with an opportunity to show their 
remorse and commitment not to repeat the unjust behavior.39  
These actions can take a variety of forms including individual 
compensation awards, community memorial funds, the creation of 
monuments and museums, the development and support of 
educational and cultural awareness programs, the establishment of 
national holidays, and the national commemoration of victims.40  
Most of these activities seek to enshrine the recognition of past 
injustices in the national memory and to honor the communities or 
individuals who suffered at the hands of past violators.41  In a 
discussion of the “anatomy of apology” Brooks explains: 
 
34 See Id. at 120.  See also Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations For Slavery Right—
A Response To Posner And Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 274–75 (2004) 
(explaining that in many cases reconciliation and redress require a degree of 
remorse that should couple something tangible with the apology in order to be 
meaningful). 
35 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 155–56 (noting the most integral parts of 
reparations as a reconciliation tool). 
36 Id. (discussing an ideal model for reparations to ensure authenticity). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  See also Roy L. Brooks, Toward A Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave 
Redress, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 49, 67 (2004) (explaining that perpetrators must 
acknowledge guilt through a tangible act demonstrating acknowledgement and 
also ask for forgiveness in order to mend antagonistic feelings between victims, 
and sometimes their descendants, and perpetrators). 
39 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 155–56.  See also Mia Swart, Name Changes as 
Symbolic Reparation After Transition: The Examples of Germany and South Africa, 9 
GERMAN L.J. 105, 107–108 (2008) (discussing the changing of names as a restorative 
measure to aid in the victim rehabilitation process). 
40 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 156. 
41 Id.  See also Swart, supra note 39, at 106 (noting that the changing of a street 
name can have at least three functions: a vehicle for commemoration, a form of 
symbolic reparation for human rights abuse, and constructing a politicized 
version of history). 
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A tender of apology is no trivial matter, particularly when 
made by state officials on behalf of their governments.  It is 
an act fraught with deep meaning and important 
consequences.   
Let us begin with some understanding of what apology is 
and is not in the context of atonement.  Apology, most 
importantly, is an acknowledgment of guilt rather than a 
punishment for guilt.  When a government perpetrates an 
atrocity and apologizes for it, it does four things: confesses 
the deed; admits the deed was an injustice; repents; and 
asks for forgiveness.42 
This process and other reconciliation efforts offer victims 
recognition and standing in the current social order and allows 
past violators to regain moral standing domestically and 
internationally.43  Although these mechanisms themselves can 
provide past violators with the smallest financial burden 
associated with reparations, the strong repudiation of the behavior 
of past regimes as well as the fear of future civil suits can deter 
governments from adopting this approach because of its political 
and/or psychic costs.44  In contrast, victims focused on current 
societal standing, as well as those focused on addressing the 
emotional cost of a painful history, may gravitate toward 
reconciliation as a reparations mechanism because of the social and 
psychic benefits it provides.45 
 
42 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 144 (emphasis in original).  Brooks goes on to note 
that government-based apologies play the vital role of clarifying often contentious 
historical records regarding past injustices.  Id. at 148–51.  In South Africa, the 
need to elaborate the record of past injustices led to a grant of amnesty for 
perpetrators of gross human rights abuses in exchange for open testimony 
detailing the atrocities inflicted during the previous regime.  See generally 
DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999) (explaining the 
South African reconciliation process and the subordination of retributive justice in 
order to discover the truth about the past). 
43 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 144–48.  Additionally, Elazar Barkan argues that at 
the very minimum these apologies lead to a reformulated historical 
understanding that is itself a form of restitution and becomes a factor in 
contemporary politics and humanitarian actions.  BARKAN, supra note 3, at 98–99. 
44 In 1996, Australia elected a more conservative government that de-
emphasized and de-funded the reconciliation efforts of the previous 
administration.  This exemplifies how a government might reject reconciliation in 
order to preserve dominant political ideologies the roots of which can be found in 
historic notions of national identity.  See BROOKS, supra note 6, at 153. 
45 See id. at 143, 170. 
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The contemporary focus on truth commissions works within 
the reconciliation model because of its ability to promote healing 
between victims and violators in the wake of gross human rights 
abuses.46  These commissions take diverse approaches, but 
regularly focus on unveiling the mystery surrounding the fate of 
disappeared and murdered community members.  To facilitate 
this, governments may offer amnesty to perpetrators of human 
rights abuses in exchange for their testimony.47  This mechanism 
allows societies to promote healing between perpetrators and 
victims using amnesty and confessions rather than tribunals and 
retribution.48  The clandestine nature of many abuses in such 
countries as South Africa and Chile has created considerable angst 
about the death and disappearance of countless loved ones.49  The 
truth and reconciliation commissions in these and other countries 
facilitate a very public process of confession, in order to allow 
perpetrators and victims to reconcile and shape a new future for 
their society.50  Unfortunately, in both South Africa and Chile, 
officials and other known perpetrators refuse to participate in 
criminal prosecution and confession. Their lack of participation 
raises questions about the effectiveness of the reconciliation 
process. 
 
 
 
46 Id. at 147–148. 
47 Id. 
48 Truth commissions offer possibilities for moving beyond political violence 
at a collective level.  This is partly a consequence of their public recognition of 
suffering and collaborative efforts to understand the complete story of the past.  
See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 79 (1998); see generally 
Roslyn Myers, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 101: What TRCs Can Teach the 
United States Justice System About Justice, 78 U.P.R. JUR. REV. 95 (2009) (recounting 
the purpose and the effectiveness of truth and reconciliation commissions). 
49 See MINOW, supra note 48, at 66–70 (describing the emotional consequences 
and the restorative power of truth commissions in South Africa and Chile). 
50 Id.; see also Myers, supra note 48, at 115–16 (“In the South African TRC, the 
needs of the victims drove the proceedings: the victims’ pursuit of information 
about what happened to loved ones who disappeared; their need to have their 
suffering acknowledged by the wider community; their desire to hear 
perpetrators admit to their abuses; and their hope to have the local and 
international community react with indignation and empathy.”); see generally 
Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding To War Crimes of Sexual 
Violence, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 217, 219 (2005) (exploring possible 
responses to “crimes of sexual violence in the context of post-conflict justice”). 
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2. REPARATIONS RECONSIDERED 
The historic implementation of reparations schemes across the 
globe often consists of a mixture of the above approaches.  In some 
cases, governments limit reparations exclusively to one of the 
above mechanisms, while in exceptional cases governments 
implement a comprehensive scheme using a configuration of all 
the above mechanisms.51  The Federal Republic of Germany 
(“FRG”) provides the seminal case of comprehensive reparations.  
In that instance, the FRG used compensation, restitution, and 
reconciliation in providing redress for the victims of the 
Holocaust.52  The program used by Germany included 
compensation to individual victims and the state of Israel, 
restitution for stolen property and forced labor, apology, and a 
variety of domestic reconciliation projects.53 
Unlike reparations undertaken by the FRG, most reparations 
schemes routinely emphasize the actions of past violators to define 
and evaluate reparations, thereby maintaining the continued 
subordination of victims and the primary importance of violators.54  
This approach can provide past violators with an almost unilateral 
ability to decide, if, when, and how to make reparations, with little 
regard to the victims’ views or role in the design and 
implementation of reparations programs.55  The actions of victims 
under this model are a secondary consideration relative to the chief 
 
51 Roy L. Brooks, Reflections on Reparations, in POLITICS AND THE PAST, supra 
note 18, at 106–07; see also Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-
American Reparations To Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002) 
(arguing the need for reparations in order to heal the racial divide in the United 
States). 
52 Brooks, supra note 51, at 108, 112. 
53 See United States Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 
German Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, 
supra note 1, at 61–65 (describing Germany’s reparations to victims of the 
Holocaust). 
54 Theo Van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United 
Nations Principles and Guidelines, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR 
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 19–21 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz, & 
Alan Stephens eds., 2009) (highlighting the growing recognition of reparations in 
human rights discourse responds to this phenomenon by elevating the 
significance of victims rights in reparations programs). 
55 Id; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 170–72 (2004) (describing the reparation 
methods employed by various South American countries in the wake of the 
military dictatorships occurring from 1970–1990). 
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concern over what actions past violators take.56  The typical 
reparations scheme also provides inadequate attention to the 
material needs of victims.57  Instead, these approaches emphasize 
the restoration of the moral standing of past violators in the 
political community.  This routinely manifests in reconciliation 
efforts intended to symbolize the restoration of social harmony 
within the political community.58  These efforts regularly sacrifice 
attention to the material needs and losses of past victims in favor of 
restoring social accord among community members.  Instead of a 
careful assessment of the steps required to enable victims to 
overcome the deficits of past injustices, reparations typically 
emphasize the remorse and regret of violators over the needs of 
victims.59  While all of the above efforts can represent important 
aspects of good reparations programs, they hinder effective 
reparations when they are out of balance with the proper attention 
to the wellbeing and engagement of past victims.60 
The result of the imbalance manifests in negative and harmful 
consequences that undermine the ultimate efficacy of reparations 
programs.  The first of these is the continued subordination of 
victims relative to governmental actors.  Most reparations 
programs reflect government efforts to redress past governmental 
harms perpetrated against citizens or other residents of a country.61  
Because the original wrongs redressed by reparations flowed from 
the misuse or abuse of government power relative to persons or 
 
56 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1 (collecting various 
authors’ accounts of the multitude of reparations regimes in the latter half of the 
twentieth century). 
57 See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS 451, 457–58 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (discussing the similar 
shortcomings between the reparations schemes from South Africa, Peru, and the 
victims of September 11); see also Cecily Rose, Looking Beyond Amnesty and 
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A Proposal for 
Truth-Telling and Reparations, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 385–86 (2008) 
(discussing the Ugandan government’s failure to respond to the victims’ need for 
reparations while granting amnesty and resettlement packages to the 
perpetrators). 
58 See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 2 (arguing that one purpose of the 
commission is to correct social history). 
59 For an examination of the role of regret in reparations policy see Jeffrey K. 
Olick & Brenda Coughlin, The Politics of Regret: Analytical Frames, in Politics in the 
Past 37 (John Torpey ed., 2003). 
60  See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 19 (stating that remorse plays a key role 
when styling systems of reparations). 
61 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1. 
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groups within a society, the creation of reparations based primarily 
on government concessions or symbolic gestures to past victims 
can continue the neglect of those harmed.62  Consequently, 
government violators may avoid responsibility for the 
deterioration of victims’ socio-economic conditions following 
reparations or reconciliation efforts by noting that, in light of their 
attempted corrections, any failure by victims to succeed is 
unrelated to past injustices.63  This rationale can easily become the 
dominant discourse in societies where victims belong to minority 
groups that suffered historic mistreatment.64  In these cases, 
officials and other segments of society expect victimized persons 
and communities to compete equally, despite the failure of 
reparations schemes to adequately redress the harms caused by 
past injustices.65 
An equally significant shortcoming in many reparations 
schemes takes place in the design process.  When countries 
contemplate ways to overcome the misdeeds of the past, they may 
see victims as passive agents who receive compensation or accept 
symbolic gestures as recognition of their mistreatment.66  This view 
of victims fails to recognize the importance of victims’ active 
engagement in the reparations process, from its design and 
implementation, to its conclusion and evaluation.67  Victims’ 
 
62 For consideration of the overwhelming rejection of the Asian Woman’s 
fund by the surviving Korean Comfort Women and other groups see infra notes 
100–110 and accompanying text. 
63 See Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparations to Restoration: Moving Beyond 
Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. 
REV. 1419, 1444–445 (2007) (maintaining that a society dedicated to moral 
restoration must find a way to integrate victims of atrocities into the social fabric 
to affirm their humanity). 
64 Many contemporary views in American society regarding African 
Americans reflect this phenomenon.  See JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, 
CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 105–36 (Routledge 2001). 
65 Id. at 127–128. 
66 The official Japanese response to the harms done to Korean comfort 
women serves as one example.  Japan’s Official Responses to Reparations, supra note 
11, at 126–31. 
67 The International Criminal Court awards victims the right to participate 
other than as witnesses in the court proceedings providing their participation 
does not infringe upon the rights of the accused.  Under this new framework, 
victims have the right to counsel, and at present, victims’ participation extends to 
issues over reparation claims, jurisdiction, investigations, indictments, 
amendments, interim release, and disclosure, question of witnesses, admissibility 
and relevancy of evidence, sentencing and other decisions of the court.  Brianne 
N. McGonigle, Bridging the Divides in International Criminal Proceedings: An 
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participation in the design of reparations enables them to see 
themselves healing and to articulate the steps needed to see that 
healing accomplished.  Moreover, victims’ involvement in the 
design process enables them to make sacrifices as well as demands, 
in order to promote the good of the larger community in addition 
to their own.68  Further, victims’ involvement in designing 
reparations also helps elevate their status in the reparations 
process in its initial stages, increasing the likelihood that they will 
be included as equal parties throughout.69 
In the implementation stages, victims’ ability to participate 
actively in a reparative process bolsters their healing, as well as the 
society’s advancement.  Through active participation and 
engagement, victims become vested participants in a reformed or 
changed society, transcending their former identity as those 
aggrieved by a former regime.70  This visible engagement, 
accompanied with the support needed to overcome past 
mistreatment, not only provides superior short-term benefits for 
victims, but also improves the long-term prospects for healing 
societal wounds by increasing victims’ ability to overcome the 
harms of the past and to take part in society.71  This approach can 
decrease the likelihood that bitterness and anger will pass down 
through generations to destabilize countries long after original 
transgressions.  Although the shape of reparations programs 
should always reflect the context of the situation and the country 
in which they take place, below the Article elaborates on how 
institutional development represents one way that victims of 
reparations can actively engage in the reparative process and 
meaningfully exercise their moral agency. 
 
 
 
Examination into the Victim Participation Endeavor of the International Criminal Court, 
21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 93, 110–111 (2009) (discussing victims’ participatory role in 
international criminal proceedings when dealing with issues such as reparations). 
68 Barkan, supra note 18, at 93. 
69 Id. (describing the successes of the Roma people due to the increased 
attention given by the European Union) 
70 Id. 
71 At a minimum, healing denotes re-establishing a connection to the 
meaning in life, in such a way that victims contemplate a future for themselves.  
See Myers, supra note 48, at 90 (emphasizing the need for victims to be the focal 
point in the healing process). 
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2.1. Reparations Cases Reviewed 
Reparations typically flow from efforts to redress historical 
practices that contemporary moral theory deems anathema.72  
Current understandings of reparations, as a practice related to 
individuals or groups rather than entire countries, can be traced 
back to the Federal Republic of Germany’s response to the gross 
atrocities committed by Nazi Germany.73  This resulted in the first 
provision of reparations to a non-state entity.  In the wake of the 
Holocaust, the Federal Republic of Germany provided a robust 
reparations scheme.74  The program provided for three reparations 
mechanisms to redress Nazi atrocities: first, supplying the State of 
Israel with goods and services; second, directly compensating Jews 
victimized by Nazi’s; and third, funding the relief and resettlement 
of persecuted Jews to Israel.75 
Another reparations case related to World War II is that of the 
Korean Comfort Women.  This matter originated in the sexual 
enslavement and forced prostitution of women and girls by the 
Japanese army from 1931 to 1944.76  During this period, Japan used 
deception and abduction to force some two hundred thousand, 
mostly Korean, women and girls into prostitution.77  In response to 
international and domestic pressure, Japan established a 
 
72 See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119 (2000) (discussing reparations 
and the conception of justice as contextualized and partial because what is 
deemed just is contingent and informed by prior injustice); see also Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–95 (illustrating how modern reparations schemes 
respond to tragedy). 
73 United States Dep’t of Justice, supra note 53, at 61–67. 
74 Id. at 62. 
75 Id.  See also Posner and Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694 (“[T]he Holocaust 
case differs from the standard cases of coerced wartime reparations.  The 
Holocaust reparations did not go to the victorious powers, and the program 
emerged more or less autonomously from the German political system . . . .”).  See 
generally Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67 
NW. U. L. REV. 479 (1972) (detailing the process that went into Germany creating 
laws and establishing proceedings to compensate the victims of Nazi 
Persecution); Roy L. Brooks, The Slave Redress Cases, 27 N.C. CENT. L.J. 130, 141–42 
(2005). 
76 BARKAN, supra note 3, at 47.  See Brooks, supra note 10, at 88–90 (explaining 
the use of the Korea’s Comfort Women as prostitutes for the Japanese army). 
77 United States Dep’t of Justice, supra note 53, at 126–31.  See also 
Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 222 (“Japan’s handling of reparations for Korean 
comfort women during War World II . . . provide[s] examples of how 
government-based reparations programs often frustrate, rather than fulfill, efforts 
to redress the wounds of past injustice.”). 
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reparations fund for surviving victims and the Japanese prime 
minister personally apologized for the atrocities.78  In the wake of 
World War II, the United States began its own reparations process 
for Native Americans with the establishment if the Indian Claims 
Commission (“ICC”).  Beginning in 1946, the ICC presided over the 
restitution and reparations of tribal claims against the United 
States and its citizens for the taking of Indian properties, treaty 
violations, and other infractions against tribes and their members.79 
One less well-known but equally interesting reparations case is 
found in the Argentinean response to the political violence carried 
out by successive military regimes from 1975 and 1983.80  During 
the period, known as the “Dirty War,” 15,000 to 30,000 civilians 
were killed.81  In addition to the military regimes’ detention, 
torture, and incarceration of those believed to have leftist 
connections, large numbers of civilians were taken by the military 
executed and without admission, acknowledgement or the return 
of their remains.82  These became known as the “disappeared.”83  
To redress these grave human rights abuses, subsequent 
democratic governments approved a number of compensation and 
other programs for the broad classes of persons who suffered 
under the regime.84  The initial laws passed reinstated public 
servants, employees of state controlled companies, teachers, and 
bank workers dismissed for political reasons.85  A second set of 
laws provided pensions to the spouses and children of the 
disappeared that included health care and pharmaceutical 
 
78 George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T 
ENOUGH, supra note 1, 113, 118. 
79 Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for Reparations, Compensation, and 
Restitution in the United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra 
note 1, at 261–66.  See also Zachary F. Bookman, Note, A Role for Courts in 
Reparations, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 75, 86–87 (2006) (explaining how the government 
sanctioned reparations program for Native Americans fail to address the needs of 
the very people they are trying address). 
80 Maria Jose Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: 
The Argentinian Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 57 at 21, 
21–22. 
81 Christina Marie Wilson, Note, Argentina’s Reparation Bonds: An Analysis of 
Continuing Obligations, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 786, 794 (2005). 
82 Id. at 794–95. 
83 Id. 
84 Guembe, supra note 80, at 31–44. 
85 Id. at 23–24. 
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benefits.86  Subsequently, numerous laws were passed to provide 
substantial compensation for detainees, the successors of the 
assassinated and the disappeared, persons born while their 
mothers were detained, minors detained or held based on their 
parents’ detention, children sold or wrongfully placed with other 
families due to their parents’ detention or disappearance, and 
those forced into exile.87 
Looking at the four reparations programs above, under this 
analysis, none could be considered good, two could be considered 
bad, and two could be considered ugly.  The FRG program for 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust represents the most sweeping and 
extensive reparations program in modern history.88  Though some 
consider it a highly successful reparations program, under my 
analysis, it approximates a good program yet still falls short.89  
Because the program grew out of negotiations with a well-
organized group representing Holocaust victims, the mechanism 
reflected a deeper appreciation for victims’ wishes and desires than 
most.90  Moreover, the program directed substantial resources that 
supported institutional development in Israel which would benefit 
victims over the long term.  This aspect was reflected in Germany’s 
provision of goods and services to Israel as well as by the 
 
86 Id. at 26. 
87 Id. at 31–44. 
88 German Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T 
ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 61–67.  See also Kim, supra note 10, at 77–78 
(“Unprecedented in its scale, the German plan has been extolled as a model 
redress scheme, with few doubting Germany’s willingness to accept its moral 
responsibility for the dark chapters of its Nazi past, or its genuine desire to 
compensate those it victimized.”). 
89 Roy L. Brooks, A Reparations Success Story, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, 
supra note 1, at 17.  See generally Menachem Z. Rosensaft & Joana D. Rosensaft, The 
Early History of German-Jewish Reparations, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, S–1 (2001) 
(explaining that although the voluntarily negotiated reparations program had a 
profound impact on German-Jewish relations, it is unlikely that anyone paid 
much attention to the relatively insubstantial individual claims of the Holocaust 
survivors). 
90 It bears noting that the quick response following the end of the war 
effectively increased the overall accomplishments of the program.  In most of the 
other cases considered, the substantial time lag between the harms inflicted upon 
victims and the decision to provide redress significantly hindered the success of 
the program.  Expeditious attention to the development of reparations programs 
increases both the quantity and quality of victim participation.  Even when 
enduring hostilities impede expeditious attention to reparations, a government 
can improve the quality and the effectiveness of reparations programs by 
engaging a reparations process at the conclusion of hostilities. 
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resettlement of persecuted Jews to Israel.91  Although this 
mechanism failed to achieve the goal of reforming institutions 
within German society that allow the active engagement and 
participation of victims in the type of reparative process articulated 
above, it served a similar function by supporting the development 
of a society focused on and committed to creating and sustaining 
those institutions.  Consequently, Israel’s development as a society 
provided Holocaust victims with both the responsibility and the 
opportunity to participate in their own repair and restoration.  In 
terms of the victims’ moral agency, the FRG program provides 
significant glimpses of how prioritizing victims’ engagement in the 
design and implementation of reparations can help improve the 
long-term success of reparations programs by supporting victims’ 
participation in their own repair and restoration. 
Unfortunately, the FRG program still suffered from substantial 
problems that mar its standing as a model for future reparations 
programs.  The limited scope of the program in reaching all the 
victims of the Nazi regime, particularly Eastern European Jews, 
Roma, and homosexuals, was one significant flaw.  The 
inadequacy of the assistance provided former victims was 
another.92  These issues keep the FRG settlement from being 
classified as “good.” 
The reparations for Korean comfort women and the ICC 
exemplify bad reparations programs.  In both cases, the victims 
played a minimal role in the program design, development, and 
implementation.93  Instead, Japanese and American bureaucrats 
respectively created a scheme and then informed the victims of its 
existence.  This top-down approach to reparations increases the 
likelihood that programs will fail to redress past injustices in a 
meaningful way. 
Through legislation following World War II, the United States 
established the ICC to settle all Indian claims that arose before 
1946.94  Although the ICC made some monetary awards, claimants 
found themselves enmeshed in highly technical adversarial 
litigation against the Department of Justice that frustrated and 
 
91 Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n, United States Dept. of Justice, German 
Compensation for National Socialist Crimes  http://www.ushmm.org/assets 
/frg.htm (last updated March 6, 1996). 
92 Kim, supra note 10, at 77–80. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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impeded their success.95  Despite its substantial and unique 
importance to claimants, the ICC refused to provide the restoration 
of land rights.96  The victims suffered additional adversity in the 
process through their interaction with private counsel, whose 
interests often differed from their clients and resulted in the loss of 
claims.97  Although Congress authorized a less formal and more 
cooperative program through its legislation, allowing the 
Commission to address moral as well as legal claims, the ICC gave 
little thought to the effect of the program on victims, and imposed 
a rigid legal structure that marginalized claimants and their 
cultural perspective.98  Instead, victims had to prove claims and 
meet substantial procedural barriers to participate in the program.  
Beyond this, the adversarial nature of the proceedings alienated 
victims and frustrated attempts to obtain restitution for the gross 
injustices they suffered.  The ICC process not only neglected the 
moral agency of victims to participate actively in the repair or 
restoration of their communities and their well-being, but also 
failed to provide sufficient restitution for many claimants in light 
of the losses they suffered.99 
Likewise, the fund set up by the Japanese parliament for the 
“Korean Comfort Women” suffered from the insufficient 
participation of victims in its design and intended operation.100  
Under the program, the Japanese government created the “The 
Asian Women’s Fund” for the benefit of former comfort women.101  
The Japanese Parliament only funded administrative operations, 
however, and left it up to the Japanese people to fund the corpus 
through their charity.102  The fund made amounts available to 
“support medical and welfare projects” which would “be of 
 
95 Id. 
96 Newton, supra note 79, at 263–267. 
97 Id. at 264. 
98 Id. at 263. See generally GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S 
BRUTAL REGIME OF ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995) 
(detailing an in-depth examination of the history of the “comfort women” and the 
events leading up to the development of the fund). 
99 Newton, supra note 79, at 263–64. 
100 Id.  See also Byoungwook Park, Comfort Women During WWII: Are U.S. 
Courts A Final Resort For Justice?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 403 (2002) (explaining 
how the Comfort Women face an ongoing, difficult task of getting their claims 
settled). 
101 Japan’s Official Responses to Reparations, supra note 11, at 129–131. 
102 Id. 
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service” to the former comfort women and Fund representatives 
engaged in dialogues with former comfort women regarding 
projects that the fund might undertake.103  Ultimately, the fund 
provided “atonement money” for each individual consisting of 
approximately $17,000 (U.S.), a letter of apology from both the 
Prime Minister of Japan and the Fund President, and access to 
some medical services to less than 20 women in the Republic of 
Korea.104 
Rather than meaningfully aiding Korean women, the fund 
further stigmatized and marginalized past victims who saw it as a 
provision of charity donated by Japanese citizens, rather than a just 
compensation scheme as requested by victims and others.105  The 
program failed to recognize the cultural context of victims and 
neglected to address their numerous concerns.106  The fund also 
placed a burden on victims to prove their victimization.107  Further, 
the Japanese government failed to accept responsibility for the 
deception and force used to abduct and sexually enslave over one 
hundred thousand Korean women.108  Out of protest against the 
Japanese government, few of the nearly 200 surviving victims 
participated in the program.  To support victims rejecting the 
Japanese award, the South Korean government provided 
comparable benefits to Korean victims who refused the Japanese 
offer.109  
The reparations program Japan implemented was doomed 
from the onset due to its failure to take meaningful account of the 
surviving Korean comfort women’s moral agency in the program’s 
initial design and subsequent development.110  Rather than 
honoring the victims’ views and working collaboratively with 
 
103 Id.  See also Jon M. Van Dyke, Reconciliation between Korea and Japan, 5 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 215, 234–35 nn.104–109 (2006) (explaining how funds would be 
distributed amongst the many different Comfort Women victims). 
104 The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund, 
http://www.awf.or.jp/e3/korea.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
105 Hicks, supra note 78, at 113, 124. 
106 Id.  See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity—Inertia, Inaction, and 
Invalidity: A Literature Review, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 269, 300–02 (1999) (detailing how 
the Japanese government disturbingly continues to avoid legal responsibility and 
liability for its appalling system of Comfort Women). 
107 Guembe, supra note 80, at 36–37. 
108 Hicks, supra note 78, at 122. 
109 The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund, supra note 104. 
110 Id. 
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them to establish an acceptable program of reparations, the 
government initially refuted responsibility and only sought 
“dialogue” with victims as an afterthought.  Japan further 
alienated the Korean victims in two ways.111  By offering meager 
awards to survivors, the Japanese government conveyed the 
message that these atrocities were mere inconveniences rather than 
drastic blows to the mental and physical health of the victims.  
Japan also alienated victims by refusing their request to identify 
and publicly acknowledge the responsibility of the perpetrators of 
the atrocities.112   
The Argentinean reparations program represents one of the 
most broad and victim-focused reparations programs to date.  The 
compensation mechanism used in most instances calculated victim 
remuneration levels based on the compensation and benefits 
provided to the highest-ranked civil servants.113  This formula 
established a spectrum of financial redress dependent upon the 
harm suffered.114  The program provided both financial and 
healthcare benefits to families who had lost the material support of 
one or more members due to the forced disappearance exacted by 
the former regimes.115  The substantial depth of the support was 
complemented by the breadth of the program which extended 
across the range of the government’s victims and even included 
foreign nationals within Argentina who suffered during the “Dirty 
War.”116 
The extension of reparations to the full range of the military 
regimes’ victims was steady but far from immediate—it took the 
government a little over a decade to pass the most important 
reparations legislation, some of which extended reparations to 
additional categories of victims.117  Argentinean human rights 
groups played a significant role in reparations discussions over the 
two decades.118  While the specific details of their involvement 
 
111 Id. 
112 Hicks, supra note 78, at 122–23. 
113 Guembe, supra note 80, at 30. 
114 The program awarded detainees compensation based on the length of 
detainment with increased amounts for injuries suffered while detained and a 
maximum increase for those who died during detention.  Id. at 32. 
115 Id. at 26. 
116 Id. at 42. 
117 Id. at 27. 
118 Guembe, supra note 80, at 22. 
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warrant further examination, the influence of victims’ groups, 
including the two organizations making up Mothers of Plaza de 
Mayo, seem clear.119  Government reparations programs sought 
and were responsive to the input of victims, their families and the 
organizations that represented them.120  Nonetheless, when 
examined closely, the case highlights important challenges facing 
both compensation programs and victim participation in the 
design of an appropriate reparations program.  A substantial 
disagreement took place within Mothers of Plaza de Mayo 
regarding reparations for the families of the disappeared.121  One 
group, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo Association, opposed reparations 
whether economic or simply in the form of an apology from the 
government.122  They maintained that families receiving economic 
reparations were “prostituting” themselves.123  The other group, 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo—Founding Group, took a contrary 
position.124  They supported reparations and contended that 
families should have the choice of claiming reparations or not on 
behalf of disappeared loved ones.125  The government finally 
adopted this approach—making reparations an optional benefit 
available to victims’ families.126  Because the vast majority of 
victims’ families and their advocate groups endorsed this 
approach, the difference of opinion within the community was 
readily resolved.  Despite the risk of disagreement, however, 
reparations programs that reflect the views, needs, and desires of 
victims have greater legitimacy and effectiveness.127 
Despite the foregoing, Argentina’s program falls short of the 
attributes of a “good” program.  Though the harms addressed and 
the beneficiaries covered were extensive, the program was 
somewhat marred by the nature of the reparations.  The use of 
 
119 Id. at 38–39. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 25. 
122 Id. 
123 Guembe, supra note 80, at 38. 
124 Id. at 25. 
125 Id. at 38. 
126 Id. 
127 It is true that governments risk being placed between competing views of 
reparations and potentially losing popular and political support for programs 
ultimately developed.  However, they can obviate that risk through the use of 
consensus-building mechanisms within organizational structures created to 
facilitate victim participation in the design of a reparations program. 
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public bonds by a poor and weak state did not guarantee 
reparation awards.  Also, the fact that recipients had to wait sixteen 
years to redeem the bonds, although both capital and interest 
payments were to be paid in the interim, hampered 
compensation.128  Due to a debt crisis in 2001, Argentina defaulted 
on its internal and external debt obligations, including reparations 
bonds.129  This resulted in the reduction of the value of some 
awards by as much as 70% and the temporary suspension of 
capital and interest payments to the beneficiaries.130  Since 2001, 
victims holding reparations bonds have lacked certainty regarding 
the extent of the economic support they can finally expect under 
the plan.  Moreover, by conditioning reparations awards on bond 
redemption, the government placed beneficiaries at risk of default 
and within the structure of a highly technical securities mechanism 
that can be difficult to navigate.131  As a result, this program, like 
the FRG’s, falls somewhere between good and ugly. 
Consistent with the growing number of reparations and 
restitution-based actions worldwide, the United Nations formally 
addressed these issues in the 1990s through the work of the U.N. 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities.132  This Sub-Commission’s work, formally developed 
through the efforts of Special Rapporteurs, Theo van Boven and M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, ultimately resulted in the U.N. General Assembly 
adopting the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in 2006.133  This Resolution 
 
128 Guembe, supra note 80, at 40–41. 
129 Wilson, supra note 81, at 788–89. 
130 Id. at 789.  See also Guembe, supra note 80, at 41 (detailing the suspension 
of capital and interest payments to beneficiaries). 
131 Guembe, supra note 80, at 44. 
132 United Nations General Assembly, Draft: Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, (2004) 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/events/meetings/docs/versionrev 
.doc (Original draft of G.A. Res. 60/147).  See generally Zakia Afrin, Foreign Direct 
Investments and Sustainable Development in the Least-Developed Countries, 10 ANN. 
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 215, 223–24 (2004) (discussing a United Nations Resolution 
addressing norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights). 
133 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
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adopted principles that present specific obligations on states guilty 
of human rights violations.134 
The principles in the Resolution relating to victims of human 
rights violations formally acknowledge restitution and 
compensation as remedial or reparative mechanisms to address 
past injustices.135  The aforementioned reparations cases also 
envisioned diverse means and mechanisms for addressing historic 
injustices.  Redress, restitution, reconciliation, remediation, 
rehabilitation, recollection, retribution, compensation, and apology 
are all terms that have been associated with the issue of 
reparations.136  The shared characteristic of each of these terms is 
an intention to correct or otherwise harmonize the past and the 
present.  As a compliment to these mechanisms, this Article 
proposes an institutional model of reparations that promotes the 
 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines 
Resolution].  See also Christopher Keith Hall, UN Convention on State Immunity: The 
Need for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 411, 413–14 (2006) 
(discussing how the rights of victims and their families to recover reparations for 
crimes under international law has been confirmed in a number of international 
instruments). 
134 Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the U.N. General Assembly’s Basic Principles and 
Guidelines Resolution, provides: 
19. Restitution should, wherever possible, restore the victim to the 
original situation before the violations of international human rights law 
or serious violations humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as 
appropriate: restoration of liberty; enjoyment of human rights, identity, 
family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration 
of employment and return of property. 
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable 
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation 
and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, such as: (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Lost 
opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits; (c) 
Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning 
potential; (d) Moral damage; (e) Costs required for legal or expert 
assistance, medicines and medical services, and psychological and social 
services.  (emphasis omitted). 
Id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
135 Id. pmbl. 
136 Id.  See generally Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A 
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 270–272 (2004) 
(outlining the different types of redress available to victims). 
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participation of victims in the existing institutions of the societies 
in which they suffered historic injustices. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL REPARATIONS: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIMENT 
The human rights community and commentators have focused 
on the use of truth commissions, compensation, and restitution to 
respond to historic injustices.  This focus has overshadowed the 
role of political, economic, and educational institutions in the 
reparations process.  Although space does not allow for a full 
elaboration of the importance of these institutions in the 
reparations process, the remainder of this Article takes note of this 
theoretical limitation in the literature through consideration of the 
often-omitted role of economic institutions in the reparations 
process for groups subjected to historic injustices.137 
The situation of post-apartheid South Africa illustrates the need 
for structural reparations to address the systemic exclusion of 
Blacks from land ownership, political participation, and economic 
ownership for most of the twentieth century.138  Rather than simply 
assessing South Africa’s reparations policies, this Article will 
discuss the limitations of traditional reparations approaches and 
explore the possibility of remedying past injustices using a 
structured, institution-based approach.  Although this Article uses 
South Africa as an example where this approach is being tested, 
space does not allow for a full-scale assessment of the quality and 
sufficiency of the government’s implementation of the program.  
Instead, this Article serves to highlight the way that an 
institutional-based approach to reparations, rather than an 
individual-based approach, can address those structural injustices 
neglected by traditional reparations approaches while 
simultaneously fostering the moral agency of victims. 
 
137 For a detailed discussion of the role of economic, political, and educational 
institutions in providing reparations for slavery and segregation to African 
Americans, see Carlton Waterhouse, The Full Price of Freedom: African American 
Responsibility to Repair the Harms of Slavery and Segregation (Aug. 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file with author) 
(discussing in detail the role of economic, political, and educational institutions in 
providing reparations for slavery and segregation to African Americans). 
138 HEATHER DEEGAN, THE POLITICS OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: APARTHEID AND 
AFTER 3–67 (2001).  The Australian aborigines, the Native Americans of North 
America, and African Americans represent additional groups who would benefit 
from structural reparations designed to produce long-term remediation of long 
standing injustices.  See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1. 
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South Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act directed the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) to consider matters 
referred to it by the Committee on Human Rights Violations and 
the Committee on Amnesty, in addition to its responsibility for 
recommending “urgent interim measures” for qualifying 
victims.139  Through these provisions, the legislation directed the 
Committee to consider individual applications for reparations and 
then determine awards for the victims of “gross violation[s] of 
human rights” that were consistent with the testimony received 
from the two other committees comprising the TRC.140  In theory, 
this two-tiered focus would allow the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee to match individual reparations 
investigations with the corresponding testimony of victims 
regarding gross human rights violations and perpetrators in 
pursuit of amnesty.141  This process did not work as originally 
contemplated, however, since the provision of reparations 
experienced considerable delays relative to the grants of 
amnesty.142 
 
139 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ss. 
25(1)(a)(i)(aa)–25(1)(a)(i)(bb), 25(1)(b)(i) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Promotion of 
National Unity Act], available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.  
See also Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid’s Victims: the Path to 
Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1163–65 (2004) (describing how South 
Africa created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to aid in addressing the 
issue of reparations). 
140 Promotion of National Unity Act 34 of 1995 s. 25(1)(a)(i)–(1)(b)(i).  This 
group of roughly 20,000 victims identified by the TRC pursuant to the statute 
contrasts with the millions of Black South Africans who suffered daily human 
rights abuses under apartheid from 1960 to 1994.  See also Erin Daly, Reparations in 
South Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 367, 394–396 (2003) (arguing 
that in order for financial reparations to be implemented there must be a reasoned 
basis for relief). 
141 Promotion of National Unity Act, s. 25(1)(a)(i).  See also Marianne Geula, 
Note, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternative Means of 
Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
57, 65–68 (2000) (describing the purpose and obligations of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). 
142 ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 334–35 (2000).  Although the first Urgent Interim 
Reparations award took place in July 1998, from 1996 to 1998 the TRC had ruled 
on almost 200 amnesty applications.  Members of the Reparations Committee 
expressed frustration that human rights violators received amnesty for their 
crimes long before their victims received reparations.  Cf. Geula, supra note 141 
(describing the purpose and obligations of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission). 
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Ultimately, the TRC submitted a host of recommendations 
addressing the individual needs of victims, their relatives, and 
communities in addition to the broader society.143  Regarding the 
larger society, the TRC proposed the following:  affirmative action 
programs for the business sector generally and the media sector 
specifically, the creation of a business reconciliation fund to finance 
Black entrepreneurship, land redistribution measures, 
compensation for loss of businesses or wages during the unrest of 
the 1980s and 1990s, and a mandatory scheme requiring restitution 
by business “for those who have suffered from the effects of 
apartheid discrimination.”144  In 1998 the TRC offered the 
following in its final report: 
The road to reconciliation, therefore, means both material 
reconstruction and the restoration of dignity. It involves the 
redress of gross inequalities and the nurturing of respect for 
our common humanity.  It entails sustainable growth and 
development in the spirit of ubuntu . . . It implies wide-
ranging structural and institutional transformation and the 
healing of broken human relationships.  It demands 
guarantees that the past will not be repeated.  It requires 
restitution and the restoration of our humanity—as 
individuals, as communities and as a nation.145 
To this end, the TRC recommended two forms of reparations 
for those persons it certified as claimants.146  The Reparations and 
Rehabilitation committee of the TRC recommended immediate 
reparations, titled “Urgent Interim Reparations,” for those facing 
pressing needs at the time the Commission submitted its first 
report, and a long-term reparations program, titled Individual 
Reparations Grants, requiring payments over a six-year term for 
the entire class of recipients.147  The interim reparations 
 
143 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 170–95 
[hereinafter TRC REPORT VOL. 5]. 
144 TRC REPORT VOL. 5, supra note 143, at 304–49.  See also Alfred L. Brophy, 
Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 497, 499 (2003) (noting that discussions regarding affirmative action and 
discussions regarding reparations are often the same discussion). 
145 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 138 
[hereinafter TRC REPORT VOL. 6]. 
146 Id. 
147 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 165.  See also Daly, supra note 145, at 
391–92 (discussing the entities that would help deliver reparations to victims). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
284 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
recommended took the form of compensation for health care, 
education, housing, welfare and other services and included 
compensation as high as R12,000 (approximately U.S. $1,630).148  
However, after receiving the final volume of the TRC report on 
April 15, 2003, the President’s Fund decided to provide a one-time 
payment of R30,000 (approximately U.S. $3,842) to the 19,000 
designated victims, totaling U.S. $85 million.149  Under the TRC 
recommendation, however, the government would have provided 
up to R2.8 billion for Individual Reparations Grants (totaling $360 
million U.S.).150  This difference resulted from a philosophical 
disagreement between President Thabo Mbeki and the TRC 
regarding financial priorities and the benefits of individual 
reparations grants.  President Mbeki viewed individual grants in 
the least favorable light, arguing that the transformation of society 
would be the best form of reparations for the victims of 
apartheid.151  The TRC, in contrast, viewed individual reparation 
grants as an important symbolic and material response to the 
victims of apartheid for the injustices they had suffered at the 
hands of the previous government.152  Therefore, in addition to 
recommending that victims be awarded reparation grants for the 
injustice they had suffered, South Africa’s TRC included a 
Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation that also 
recommended symbolic reparations.153 
Despite the substantial recommendations by the Committee, 
South Africa’s reparations process “has generated significant 
 
148 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 172.  See also Susan Ayres, Hélène 
Cixous’s The Perjured City: Nonprosecution Alternatives to Collective Violence, 9 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2005) (explaining that many believed TRC acknowledging 
victims’ stories was affirming and healing for those victimized and characterizing 
TRC as an engine for collective healing). 
149 Thabo Mbeki, President, South African, Statement to the National Houses 
of Parliament and the Nation at the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 7 (Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Mbeki, Report of the 
TRC], available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices 
/030610presrec.htm. 
150 Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 1079 (2003). 
151 Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149.  See Hamber, supra note 150, at 
1079 (discussing the decision of President Mbeki to award a lower amount than 
recommended by the TRC Report). 
152 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 105–09; Ayres, supra note 148, at 28. 
153 Rose, supra note 57, at 387 (detailing that symbolic reparations might 
include memorials, reburials, renaming of streets and days of remembrance). 
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dissatisfaction among victims.”154  First, the government was very 
slow to respond to the TRC’s recommendations about payments.155 
Second, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
which authorized the formation of the TRC and outlined its 
responsibilities, included no requirements for reparations from the 
actual perpetrators or other beneficiaries of apartheid.156 
Under the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, millions of South 
Africans arguably qualified for compensation based on physical 
and mental harm; lost opportunities; moral damage; and legal and 
medical expenses.157  The TRC reparations grants paled in 
comparison to the harms inflicted on South African Blacks, yet an 
award of compensation to the majority of South Africans was also 
untenable.158  The harms of apartheid could not be meaningfully 
redressed by a single R30,000 grant or a six year R23,000 award.159 
Apartheid robbed the majority of South Africans of the skills 
and opportunities needed to participate fully in the economic 
sector of South African society.160  In 1998, 85% of the country’s 
managers were white while, in addition, whites made up 93% and 
92% respectively of the senior and executive managers.161  Blacks 
made up 15% of all levels of management and Native African 
women accounted for only 6% of the country’s managers, though 
women represented roughly 35% of all management levels.162  Of 
South Africans whose income reached R6,401 or more per month, 
 
154 Id. at 387–88. 
155 Id. at 387. 
156 Id. 
157 See TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 160–61; see also Basic Principles 
and Guidelines Resolution, supra note 133. 
158 See TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 161 (noting that, given its limited 
resources, providing reparations to over 20 million Black South Africans was not 
feasible); see also Rose, supra note 57, at 387–88 (asserting that despite TRC’s 
recommendations, the reparations process in South Africa has not been 
satisfactory in the eyes of the victims). 
159 See Rose, supra note 57, at 387 n.323 (detailing the Committee’s proposed 
compensation to vicitims); see also Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149 
(stating that a R30,000 grant would be provided to those victims designated by the 
TRC). 
160 Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149. 
161 DEEGAN, supra note 138, at 120. 
162 Id. 
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whites outnumbered Africans three to one, though in population 
Africans outnumbered whites eight to one.163  At the bottom of the 
income scale, the inverse was true: of South Africans making less 
than R1,600 per month, Blacks outnumbered whites eighteen to 
one.164 
To address the legacy of apartheid, the government passed a 
series of laws.165  These include: the Higher Education Act, the 
Skills Development Act, the Employment Equity Act, the Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, the Land Restitution and Reform 
Act, Restitution of Land Rights Act, and the Land Reform (“Labour 
Tenants”) Act.166  Although each of these address some reparative 
purpose relative to the history of apartheid, the rest of this Article 
will focus on the Employment Equity Act and the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act because of their direct relation to the society’s 
economic institutions.  Each of these statutes will be described in 
brief, including the reparative function they perform, before 
discussing the combined impact of the individual programs. 
4.1. The Employment Equity Act and the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 
The Employment Equity Act establishes affirmative 
employment practices for training and hiring suitable persons from 
designated groups.167  For companies with fifty or more employees 
 
163 775,165 whites in South Africa earned R6401 per month or more.  In 
contrast, only 223,116 Native Africans did so.  For every Native African making 
R6,401 or more per month, there were three whites making as much or more.  
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA, CENSUS 2001: PRIMARY TABLES SOUTH AFRICA 74 tbl.16.3 
(2001), available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/HTML/RSAPrimary 
.pdf. 
164 4,241,371 native Blacks make R1,600 or less per month.  Only 237,505 
whites made R1,600 or less per month.  Accordingly, for every white person 
making R1,600 or less per month, there are eighteen Blacks in the same income 
range.  Id. 
165 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.); Land 
Restitution and Reform Amendment Act 18 of 1999 (S. Afr.); Skills Development 
Act 97 of 1998 (S. Afr.); Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.); Higher 
Education Act 101 of 1997 (S. Afr.); Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
(S. Afr.); Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (S. Afr.).. 
166 Id.  See also F. Michael Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States 
and South Africa: Lessons From the Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 187, 213–
14 (1999) (describing the support for affirmative action and the Employment 
Equity Act in South Africa). 
167 Designated groups consist of Black South Africans, women, and people 
with disabilities.  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 5.1 (S. Afr.).  Black South 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/5
 
2009] THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 287 
or with substantial annual receipts for their industry, the Act 
requires numerical goals and preferential treatment to ensure 
equitable representation.168  The Act directs employers to 
implement measures identifying and eliminating employment 
barriers that adversely affect people from designated groups; 
further diversity in the workplace; make reasonable 
accommodation for people from designated groups to ensure 
representation; and implement appropriate training measures.169 
The specified purpose of the Employment Equity Act includes: 
“Implementing affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups, 
in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce.”170  As a reparative 
measure, the Act seeks to create job opportunities and training 
across professions and career paths for Blacks excluded from 
occupying most positions under apartheid.171  The goal of the Act 
is to bring the masses of the South African population slowly into 
offices, positions, and career paths consistent with their numerical 
representation within the society.172 
In South Africa, this means the reversal of a century-long 
structural exclusion of these groups from gaining the training and 
skills required for these jobs, as well as the economic benefit of the 
higher salaries they provide.  Because the Act mandates 
implementation at all levels for designated employers, its faithful 
implementation will racially reform those institutions, ensuring 
that the victims of apartheid benefit from the power and positions 
 
Africans include native Africans, Indians, and people of color.  See generally Karin 
van Marle, “Meeting the World Halfway”—The Limits of Legal Transformation, 16 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. 651, 658–60 (2004) (discussing the limitations of the definition of 
designated groups in the context of employment integration). 
168 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 5.1 (S. Afr.) (“designated employer). 
169 Id. s. 15(2). 
170 Id. s. 2. 
171 Id. s. 2 (noting that the Act seeks to create jobs for South African Blacks).  
But see Elizabeth Hoffman, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Discrimination Against the 
Majority Undermines Equality, While Continuing to Benefit Few Under the Guise of 
Black Economic Empowerment, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 87, 103–04 (2008) 
(referencing Phinda Madi, a well known Black critic of Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment, who argues that while a job would be extremely 
empowering for most South Africans, Black Empowerment has created almost no 
new jobs but rather has reinforced the economic divides put in place by apartheid 
without adding a mechanism to destroy them). 
172 See Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 2 (S. Afr.) (calling for a workforce 
representative of the South African people). 
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from which they were excluded.  Although the process will likely 
take a generation or more for completion due to the extreme level 
of deprivation caused by apartheid, it ultimately places Blacks, 
along with whites, in control of the economic institutions of the 
nation.  This program operates primarily as an individual rather 
than communal-based approach to reparations, however, the 
transfer of power within these institutions to the former victims of 
apartheid results in the redistribution of the benefits associated 
with their operation, as well as those gained from the positions 
held within them.  In the South African context, where the 
apartheid victims constitute the majority of the population, this 
methodology addresses a significant aspect of the group-based 
injury caused by apartheid.  The status, money, and power 
associated with positions obtained through the Act directly reverse 
the former denial of the same positions based on race. 
Substantial debate exists regarding the benefits of affirmative 
action and related programs in both the United States and South 
Africa.  As a nation in transition, South Africa’s approach may be 
viewed as unique to situations of transitional justice andd 
inapplicable to other frameworks.173  However, the distinction 
between ordinary and transitional justice should not be 
overstated.174  South Africa employs affirmative action along with a 
host of other reparative programs, all of which should be viewed 
as part of a comprehensive strategy to redress the harms of 
apartheid.175  The program in the United States originated along 
 
173 For an examination of transitional justice theory see RUTI TEITEL, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000). 
174 A rigid distinction between transitional and ordinary periods neglects the 
dynamic nature of justice and the importance of backward-looking justice, not just 
in transitional periods but at all times.  See Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, 
Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons From South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 47, 50–52 (2004) (critiquing Teitel and the theory of transitional justice). 
175 The debate over affirmative action as a tool for addressing historic 
injustices continues.  See THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE 
WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 166–84 (2004); see also, FAYE J. CROSBY, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IS DEAD: LONG LIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 221–39 (2004) (discussing and 
evaluating the debate over affirmative action).  For a favorable examination of 
affirmative action policies in the United States and South Africa see 
Higginbotham, supra note 166; see also Adila Hassim, Affirmative Action Policies in 
The United States and South Africa: A Comparative Study, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW 
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119 (2000) (comparing the history and positive functions of 
affirmative action in the United States and South Africa). 
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similar lines.176  Because of the historic discrimination against 
Blacks and others, the American government instituted affirmative 
action in hiring and contracting in the wake of the civil rights 
movement as a way to remedy the discrimination of the past.177 
However, South African programs should be distinguished 
from the United States’ affirmative action program on two primary 
bases: the continued minority status of Black beneficiaries in the 
U.S. context; and the limited scope of the American program.  
Affirmative action in the United States could have functioned 
reparatively to remedy some harm of slavery and segregation; 
however, as designed and implemented it failed to do so.178  The 
continued minority status of Blacks in the United States, coupled 
with the persistence of racism, restricted the ability of Blacks to 
gain offices and positions in American society that they and their 
ancestors were denied based on race.  The limited scope of 
mandatory affirmative action in America further exemplifies this 
point.  Affirmative action regulation was restricted to government 
positions and contractors and never applied to large segments of 
the private sector.179  Furthermore, even the affirmative action 
programs guiding government contracting only resulted in a five 
percent set-aside under some federal programs for women, 
minorities, and other small disadvantaged businesses combined, 
though they comprise the majority of the country’s population.180 
The South African program, in contrast, places the country’s 
vast resources in the hands of the former victims, providing them 
with an institutional structure to support the long-term 
remediation of the harms of apartheid.181  This is not to suggest 
that affirmative action should be viewed as a panacea or even a 
potential cure for all of South Africa’s ills.  Rather, this Article 
seeks to emphasize the program’s potential to provide new 
 
176 See PHILIP RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 1619—2000, at 135–
166 (2001) (detailing the advent and development of affirmative action from 1955 
through 1993). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 188 (estimating the damage of slavery as far exceeding the value of 
all benefits accorded Blacks in subsequent years). 
179 See ROY L. BROOKS, GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO & GORDON A. MARTIN, JR., 
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 1071–1171 (1995) (examining affirmative action case law). 
180 See the National Defense Authorization Act for 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 
1207, 100 Stat. 3973–75 (establishing a 5% contract goal on Department of Defense 
awards to small disadvantaged businesses). 
181 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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opportunities to large numbers of South Africans that will enable 
them to take an active role in redressing the historic discrimination 
of the South African employment sector through their role in 
staffing and managing the nation’s businesses.  The Black 
Economic Empowerment Act (“BEE”) also promotes an 
institutional approach to remedying apartheid’s harms.  Under the 
terms of this Act, companies doing business with the South African 
government or any organ of the state for procurement, licensing, or 
public-private partnerships, must diversify their equity ownership 
to include Blacks at levels set by the cabinet members that oversee 
the particular industries.182  The Act has increased integration and 
Black South Africans have become increasingly empowered in the 
business sector since 1994. Some Blacks occupy positions in senior 
management or on the Boards of Directors of South African 
companies.183  However, as Tangri and Southall note: 
It has also been observed that the number of black 
managers in the private sector is still small and black 
people are hardly in controlling positions in capital. In an 
October 2005 report released by the Black Business 
Executive Circle, it was recorded that only five of the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (“JSE”) top 200 
companies had black ownership of more than 51 percent, 
only 27 companies had more than 25 percent, and these 32 
companies together accounted for less than 2 percent of the 
JSE’s market capitalization.184 
 Along with set targets, officials use a scorecard that 
examines the following indicators of economic involvement: direct 
empowerment through ownership and control of enterprises and 
assets; procurement from the aforementioned designated groups; 
the development of enterprises involving designated groups; and 
corporate investment that benefits members and communities from 
 
182 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 s. 9 (S. Afr.).  
See generally Daniel M. Ludlam, From Mandela and MLK to BEEcom and the SBA: 
Laying the Groundwork For Equality Through Business Development Programs in South 
Africa and the United States, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 389–90 (2007) 
(discussing the importance of achieving the goals advanced by the preamble of 
the BEE). 
183 See Roger Tangri & Roger Southall, The Politics of Black Economic 
Empowerment in South Africa, 34 J.S. AFR. STUD. 699, 700 (2008) (discussing the 
changes in Black South African involvement in the business sector). 
184 Id. at 700. 
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the designated groups and other workforce-related categories.185  
This program could provide substantial institutional reparations 
through redistributing ownership of South Africa’s corporations to 
the victims of apartheid. 
Criticisms of the BEE abound.  Substantial challenges exist to 
enable it to meet its potential.186  Because the program has turned 
some ANC elites into instant millionaires, critics see it as a vehicle 
for enriching the party faithful rather than a genuine means of 
transforming South African society.187  The early criticism of the 
BEE’s exclusive enrichment of a few individuals seems well placed.  
To meet its reparative potential, the benefit of equity ownership in 
South Africa’s businesses must be spread across those 
communities and groups harmed by apartheid in order to remedy 
the exclusionary practices of the previous political and economic 
regime.  In response to the perceived abuse and the narrow initial 
approach to the program, the government has more recently 
directed the program to communities, civil society, and workers.  
This approach flows from the adoption of a broad-based BEE 
(“BBBEE”) “aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by 
seeking to substantially and [sic] equitable transfer ownership, 
management, and control of South Africa’s financial and economic 
resources to the majority of its citizens.”188  However: 
 
185 Id. at 706.  See also S. AFR. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, SOUTH AFRICA’S 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 4–12 (2003), available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/bee.htm 
(studying the lasting influences of apartheid, and the success of BEE initiatives to 
achieve economic integration). 
186 As a part of the ANC’s adoption of a neo-liberal market philosophy to 
transform South African society, the BEE faces many of the same criticisms.  See 
IAN TAYLOR, STUCK IN MIDDLE GEAR: SOUTH AFRICA’S POST APARTHEID FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 67–83 (2001) (analyzing and critiquing the ANC’s move away from 
their more radical socialist ideology to a right-of-center economic approach that 
protects business and investment); HEIN MARAIS, SOUTH AFRICA: LIMITS TO 
CHANGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION 160–95 (2001) (explaining how 
the ANC, like many other such movements quickly adopted a less drastic, more 
business and capital friendly economic structure after assuming power). 
187 William M. Gumede, Down to Business But Nothing to Show, in THABO 
MBEKI’S WORLD: THE POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT 207–
10 (Sean Jacobs & Richard Calland eds., 2002) (noting that many BEE measures 
benefit a small elite—often comprised of former ANC members who left politics 
to pursue business—at the expense of the Black majority); See also Tangri & 
Southall, supra note 183, at 704 (highlighting the failure to the BEE initiatives to 
achieve meaningful integration of Blacks into the white economy). 
188 Gumede, supra note 187, at 214. 
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While BBBEE was created to make South Africa’s economy 
more representative of the demographic makeup of the 
country, major structural flaws have continued to 
disempower the black majority.  These flaws include, but 
are not limited to, the focus on black ownership and 
management, lack of mandatory compliance with BBBEE 
policy, the economic rise of “black diamonds,” and the 
continuation of a small class of economic dominance.189 
Succeeding in this task presents a challenge that will require 
greater governmental monitoring and private sector cooperation 
than has occurred so far.190  The potential offered by the program 
to redress some of the economic harms of apartheid and to enable 
its former victims to own, control, and participate in the 
institutions that once excluded them, underscores the potential of 
institutional based reparations to redress deep structural inequities 
untouched by the prevailing models of reparations.191  In short, 
institutionally-based reparations that focus on providing the 
former victims of human rights abuses with the ability to own and 
manage the resources from which they were formerly excluded 
represent an important and under-explored reparations 
mechanism.192 
Beyond the position, status, and income redistributed by the 
Employment Equity Act, the BBBEE can potentially redistribute 
wealth in South African society and the power that accompanies it.  
Moreover, this institutional mechanism for addressing the harms 
of apartheid in South Africa highlights the way that institutional 
reparations can alter the fundamental distribution of goods in a 
society and its communities.  Together these two Acts, taken along 
with political reforms that place the former apartheid victims in 
 
189 Hoffman, supra note 171, at 96. 
190 Gumede, supra note 187, at 215–16 (explaining that critical to Mbeki’s pro-
business strategy is greater willingness from the government and the middle 
management sector to cooperate in the transformative change of South African 
business and society). 
191 Id. 
192 This approach fits into the transformative model of justice that focuses on 
institutional changes that transform the society at multiple levels rather than a 
mere governmental transition.  See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting A 
Path To Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 74 (2002) (explaining the role of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in transforming South African society as a 
whole, in contrast to mere top-down regulations that allow a transition of power 
without deeper transformation of society). 
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positions of power, can change the institutional structure of the 
South African economic sector.  The distinctness of these 
institutional approaches underscores my argument that 
reparations focused on reforming or creating institutional 
structures can create a wealth of new opportunities for harmed 
communities, their individual members, and the societies in which 
they operate.  Moreover, unlike the passive receipt of 
compensation, participation in South Africa’s institutionally based 
programs can empower victims to engage their society as political 
and economic agents who play a vital role in shaping its future.  
Clearly, the successful implementation of institutional schemes in 
the South African context also faces many challenges.193 
5. CONCLUSION 
This Article’s analysis suggests the use of measures as criteria 
for assessing reparations programs.  Although a full elaboration of 
such measures will be the subject of future research, a brief 
consideration of some essential measures is in order.  Scope, scale, 
structural inclusion, accessibility, and procedural inclusiveness 
serve as significant criteria for assessing reparations programs and 
the role of victims within them.  The scope of a program describes 
the range of harms redressed within a reparations scheme.  
Programs that exclusively address limited types of harm such as 
property loss or physical injury have a narrow scope.  The Asian 
Women’s Fund established for victims of the Japanese Army was 
very narrow in its scope.194  In contrast, programs that recognize 
and respond to an assortment of harms flowing from human rights 
abuses are broad in scope.  Scale speaks to the substantive value or 
depth of the redress provided.  This measure focuses on the 
amount or extent of redress.  The compensation scheme used in 
Argentina that provided former detainees with awards based on 
mid to high level civil servant salaries called for high scale 
redress.195  Structural inclusiveness relates to the breadth of victims 
 
193 See generally MARAIS, supra note 186 (assessing the substantial obstacles 
facing the ANC’s market-based approach to societal transformation); GUY 
ARNOLD, THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (2000) (discussing the huge political and 
economic changes in South Africa from 1994 to 1998, and considering the vast 
challenges facing the country under Mbeki’s rule). 
194 WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 128–131. 
195 Guembe, supra note 80, at 31–44 (2006) (explaining that for each day of 
proven detention, victims received 1/30 the monthly salary of the highest paid 
category of civil servants). 
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covered under a program.  One of the biggest shortcomings of the 
FRG reparations program was its exclusion of whole classes of 
victims such as the Roma who also suffered under the Nazi 
regime.196  Argentina, in contrast, extended its program to the 
broadest range of victims; achieving a high degree of structural 
inclusiveness.197  Procedural inclusiveness examines the level of 
victim involvement in reparations program development.  The 
Federal Republic of Germany’s negotiation of reparations terms 
with Jewish victim’s groups in the wake of World War II 
demonstrates significant procedural inclusiveness although the 
range of victim classes involved was limited.  The accessibility 
assesses victims’ ability to obtain or make use of reparations.  The 
Indian Claims Commission as a mechanism for redress represented 
the lowest degree of accessibility; it forced victims to conform to a 
highly bureaucratic adversarial process foreign to them and their 
way of life.198  Overall, it impeded rather than facilitated redress. 
This failure to attend to the basic needs of the programs 
beneficiaries reflects the frequent shortcoming of reparations 
programs from victims’ perspectives.  By reframing program 
development in light of victims’ needs and perspectives, future 
programs will hopefully lead to more “good” if not better 
reparations programs.  Making sure that all victims can take 
advantage of opportunities and participate equally in reforms, 
minimizing resentment held by other members of society not 
directly benefiting from reparative programs, and ensuring that 
new or reformed institutions deal fairly and openly within the 
society represent a few of the many difficulties that reparations 
programs need to address.  Developing more inclusive reparations 
programs that engage victims in their design and implementation 
serves an overlooked but important role in the process of 
redressing historic injustices. 
 
 
 
 
 
196 Kim, supra note 10, at 77 (emphasizing that the failure of the German 
reparations program was the classes of victims excluded from the process who 
have “suffered in relative silence”). 
197 Guembe, supra note 80. 
198 Newton, supra note 79, at 262–64. 
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